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Abstract. Many contemporary debates on the nature of mechanisms
centre on the issue of modulating negative causes. One type of negative
causability, which I will refer to here as causation by absence, appears
to be difficult to incorporate into modern accounts of mechanistic expla-
nation. This paper argues that a recent attempt to solve this problem,
proposed by Benjamin Barros, needs to be improved since it overlooks
the fact that not all absences qualify as sources of mechanism failure.
Instead, I maintain, that there is a number of additional types of effects
caused by absences that need to be incorporated in order to account
for the diversity of causal connections in the biological sciences. My
aim is to provide means for incorporation without compromising the
mechanistic notion of causal productivity.
1. Introduction
Specification of negative causes is an integral part of molecular biology and
neurobiology. Terms such as antagonists, blockers, repressors, depressors,
gates, gene-knockouts etc. exemplify instances of negative causation. It is
widely agreed that these terms play a fundamental role in mechanistic expla-
nation (Craver 2007; Machamer 2004). There are several types of causal claims
that might be regarded as “negative”, including preventions/interferences;
omissions/absences; disconnections and mixtures of these. Here I will scruti-
nize the putative problem of causation by absence as it occurs in the context
of mechanistic explanation.
According to one of the most prominent conceptions of mechanistic ex-
planation, advocated by the team of Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and
Carl Craver (2000) (MDC), mechanisms are specified through descriptions of
their entities and activities that are organized as to causally produce some
phenomenon. MDC’s account features the (causal) notion of productivity as
understood through the lens of the ontic view of explanation and the physical
process account of causation.1
Since the mechanistic production view of causation requires some sort of
transfer of energy or forces from one entity to another, the problem of causa-
tion by absence is based on the notion that absences cannot participate in such
transfers. They lack the appropriate “oomph” (see, e.g., Schaffer 2004; 2005;
c.f., Beebee 2004; Dowe 2004). From this aspect it is hard to see how there
can be a physical dependency relation of production between a nothing and
a something. Put somewhat awkwardly, since the idea of production requires
that all producers of change are presences, absences cannot be cited as causes.
This paper attempts to alleviate this problem by showing how absences can
1To be clear, I am not conflating the ontic view with the physical process view here.
Indeed one could be committed to an ontic sense of explanation without being committed
to a physical process account of causation.
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be read into mechanistic specifications of causal productivity and explanations
thereof. It is worth emphasizing that the problem of absences is not tied to
mechanistic explanation per se but is a problem about causation and causal
explanation in general. Nevertheless, the discussion here will be confined to
the problem as it appears in the mechanistic context.2
The text is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the notion of causal
productivity as it is commonly conceived of in leading accounts of mechanistic
explanation. In section 3, I provide some examples of absences and show
why they are essential for explaining biological mechanisms in sciences such
as neurobiology and physiology. Section 4 considers the recent attempt by
Benjamin Barros (2013) to characterize absences as instances of mechanism
failure. Here I argue that Barros’ solution is not complete since it leaves
out several important types of causes and effects associated with absences
in the biological sciences. Section 5 presents a new way of conceptualizing
mechanistic explanations of absences, grounded in a contrastive approach,
which I believe to be compatible with how the notion of causal productivity
is understood by contemporary mechanists. Some concluding thoughts are
presented in section 6.
2. Causally productive causal processes
This section considers the notion of causal production and its rather ele-
mental role for describing and explaining mechanisms. More specifically, the
focus of attention is on showing why incorporating absences with mechanistic
conceptions of productivity have proved to be elusive.
As a causal concept invoked for describing mechanisms, productivity goes
back to Wesley Salmon’s Causal-Mechanical (CM) theory of causation and
causal explanation, which characterizes causation in terms of causal processes
that interact with one another by exchanging conserved quantities (Salmon
1978; 1984, c.f., Dowe 2000; 2009). As such, Salmon’s theory takes causal
relations between events to consist in processes grounded in the language
of fundamental science (e.g., energy, mass, momentum, charge). One of the
motivations behind the CM theory of causation was to substitute talk of events
with talk of persistent processes in space-time. Another motivation was to
eliminate talk of agency that Salmon took to extenuate “the fundamental
objective and ‘ontic’ nature of causation” (Dowe 2009, p. 214).
Building on Salmon’s legacy, contemporary mechanistic approaches to cau-
sation seek to describe mechanisms as relative to some appropriate chains of
events exhibiting physical continuity.3 Philosophers of science have in more
recent years offered a plethora of mechanistic characterizations of causality
and causal explanation (see, e.g., Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Craver 2007;
Glennan 1996; 2002; Craver 2007; Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000; Tor-
res 2009; Illari and Williamson 2012; Woodward 2011). Although there are
considerable dissimilarities between these approaches, they are extraneous to
the points made in this paper. So, for clarity of exposition, the main focus
2My treatment of the problem is not intended as a comprehensive account of absence
causation in general. Also, I will remain neutral on matters concerning the existence of
absences, i.e. whether or not absences are genuine causes.
3Following Jonathan Schaffer’s view of causation as a quaternary, contrastive relation
(Schaffer 2005), this papers envisages the causal relata as contrasts between effect and
cause variables (further assuming that these are events, or sets of events). A schematic
formulation of this idea corresponds to: C rather than not-C causes E rather than not-E.
This states that different choices of contrast classes provide different causal claims.
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here will be on the Machamer, Darden and Craver (2000) account. MDC
characterize mechanisms as follows:
Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that
they are productive of regular changes from start or set-up
to finish or termination conditions. (Machamer et al. 2000,
p. 3)
What distinguishes MDC’s and many of the other mechanist approaches from
Salmon’s CM theory approach to causal explanation, is the shift in view from
causal processes as mechanistic interactions to causal processes as mechanis-
tic systems. In general, the difference is that the systems approach focus on
somewhat regular types of phenomena while the CM approach pivots around
describing particular events (Glennan 2010). At any rate, the systems ap-
proach allows MDC to analyze the operation of mechanisms in terms of the
stability and regularity in the operation of entities and activities bringing
about phenomenon. From this aspect it follows that mechanistic systems can
be more or less stable, regular and operational over time.
At the heart of MDC’s analysis is the idea of physical dependency between
the organizational features responsible for producing, maintaining and under-
lying phenomena. Essentially, these features can only be accounted for by ontic
referents. When, for example, explaining how a neuron’s membrane potential
depolarizes during an action potential, the ontic condition confines the citing
of explanans to physical objects, such as the increase in permeability to Na+
(Craver 2007). This means that only entities and activities physically present
in mechanisms, such as Na+, qualify as component parts of mechanisms and
explainers thereof.
Modern mechanists take significance in the ontic structure that models
describe by seeking to characterize the oomph between the causal producers
of change. This strategy turns on connecting mechanistic models to physical
structures exhibited by mechanisms responsible for producing the phenomenon
of interest. The more specific notion of ontic adequacy requires that elements
described in the model should map onto the elements found in the mechanism.
Only in this respect do models become informative about the ontic explanation
by describing the oomphs involved in the operation of mechanisms. Therefore,
it is useful to make a distinction between representational models or schemes
of mechanisms and the mechanisms they describe (Craver 2006; Kaplan 2011).
Arguably, both Salmon’s and MDC’s way of framing causal interaction as
physically continuous processes becomes problematic when implementing ab-
sences as causes and effects in descriptions of mechanisms. It would appear
that absences resist any stronger ontological reading because, as Jonathan
Schaffer puts it, “absence causation is metaphysically abhorrent. When the
gardener does not water my flowers, there is no energy-momentum flow or
other physical process connecting this absence (wherever located, if at all) to
the wilting flowers. Absences impart no ‘oomph’.” (Schaffer 2005, p. 300, orig-
inal emphasis). Hence, it appears that the problem with fitting absences into
mechanistic explanations of productivity is that absences violate the mecha-
nistic condition of physical connectivity since they impart no “oomph”. Com-
parably, when viewed through the lens of ontic explanation, absences seem to
lack causal status and cannot be fully captured by an ontic account.
In conclusion, this section has made clear why the concept of causal produc-
tivity, as it is currently conceived of in terms of physical continuous processes,
appears to be incompatible with the idea of absences as causes and causal
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explainers of mechanisms. In what follows, I will argue that absences are an
essential part of mechanistic explanation by referencing to examples of their
role as causes and effects in the biomedical sciences and beyond. The idea is
that the problem of incorporating absences has to be solved in order to obtain
a more complete understanding of mechanisms and mechanistic explanation.
3. Causation by absence in the biological sciences
So what is causation by absence? What exactly does this type of claims
amount to? As it is commonly conceived, absence causation is the notion
that treats the non-existence of an event as a cause/effect. In this section
we will explore absences in scientific practices where they are cited most fre-
quently. I will also illustrate two features of absences that deserve emphasis.
Firstly, that cases of causation by absence, such as in Helen Beebee’s exam-
ple “I killed the plant by not watering it” (Beebee 2004), display no physical
continuity between Beebee’s omission to water the plant and its subsequent
death. Secondly, I want to suggest that there is a nuanced yet important dif-
ference between describing the lack of calcium (Ca) as causing stunted plant
growth, and describing the (total) absence of calcium as causing the death of
the plant’s terminal buds.
Indeed there are innumerable examples to choose from for the purpose of
illustrating causes and effects by absences, a fact that has been duly noted
by many philosophers, especially Schaffer: “what causes scurvy is an absence
of vitamin C, what causes rickets is an absence of vitamin D, what causes
diabetes millets is an absence of insulin...” (Schaffer 2004, p. 202). We will
center our attention here on two interesting examples from physiology and
neurophysiology.
The first example to consider is lactose intolerance, which is a disorder
affecting the digestion of lactose. Lactose is a disaccharide composed of glucose
and galactose and replete in milk and milk-based food products. The inability
to absorb lactose is most probably caused by a deficiency of the enzyme lactase
(Vesa et al. 2000). This intestinal enzyme is responsible for hydrolyzing lactose
into its constituent monosaccharides, glucose and galactose. Monosaccharides
such as glucose and galactose are simple carbohydrates that can be absorbed
in the digestive tract. Lactase makes the digestion possible by breaking down
more complex carbohydrate lactose because disaccharides such as lactose and
sucrose are too large to be absorbed (i.e. transported from the intestinal lumen
across the epithelium into the bloodstream).
Lactose intolerance is one of several digestive disorders that might be caused
by a deficiency in the gene for lactase or induced by environmental factors.
Such deficiencies are caused by an absence, whereby in this case the absence
can be understood as either a piecemeal lack of something, such as lactase,
calcium etc, or it can be understood as the complete non-existence of some-
thing, as for instance a regulatory gene. Seemingly, biology and biomedicine
has an abundance of each type. It goes without saying that biomedical sci-
entists investigating the causes of these diseases would be vexed by the view
that absences are not genuine causes, since reasoning about absences under-
pins most of their work.
In any event, it is easy to notice the transitivity common in many mecha-
nistic processes. For instance, as in the very common chain of events when the
absence of the gene for lactase, present from birth, leads to lactose intolerance
which, in turn, leads to a decrease in milk (calcium) consumption, which may
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then lead to nutrition-related diseases such as osteomalacia and rickets as reg-
ularly effected by calcium deficiency. This illustrates that complicated series
of interconnected events involving effects/causes due to absences are common
in contemporary physiology. We now turn to the second example.
In neurobiology the last couple of decades has witnessed some very exciting
research on the biochemistry underlying the formation of long-term memory.4
The phenomenon of long-term potentiation (LTP) is considered to be a useful
model for studying synaptic changes that underlie memory and learning. It
is commonly held that the N -methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptor5 has a
pivotal role in the mechanism of LTP. NMDA is a structural analogue to glu-
tamate, which is a negatively charged amino acid and a constituent of protein.
In the central nervous system glutamate (i.e. glutamic acid) acts as an exci-
tatory neurotransmitter that binds to glutamate receptors such as the NMDA
receptor, which forms a channel through the membrane of postsynaptic neu-
rons. As NMDA binds to the NMDA receptor the ion channel will open by
discharging the Mg2+ ion blocking the channel. This allows the intracellular
build-up of calcium (Ca2+) ions to diffuse through the neuronal membrane via
the ion-channels into the cell. Since the Mg2+ ions prevent Ca2+ ions from
entering the ion-channels, the absence of Mg2+ is an intermediate cause of the
influx of Ca2+ in the process ultimately leading to the strengthening of the
synapse (LTP). The example of LTP, which has become the pet example of
philosophers of science, illustrates how an absence can effectuate the produc-
tivity of a causal process without there being a physical connection between
every cause and effect in the mechanistic chain of events along the way. Ev-
idently, there is no physical interaction taking place between the Mg2+ and
Ca2+ ions in the mechanism of LTP.
I will return to the instances of LTP involving the Mg2+ removal and sub-
sequent Ca2+ diffusion later. For now, the important lesson is to recognize
that biological and neurobiological practice treats absences as causal produc-
ers of change. In this respect, the integration of absences becomes crucial for
making sense of their roles as causes and causal explainers of mechanisms in
scientific practice.
4. Absences as instances of mechanism failure
One proposed way of resolving the incorporation problem is by treating
absences as causes of mechanism failure. The literature on causation provides
many accounts of causal failures, usually represented as deviations from de-
fault values (c.f. Menzies 2009). By implementing these ideas in the context
of mechanistic explanation, Benjamin Barros (2013) proposes an interesting
approach that considers a mechanism’s failure to operate, as caused by the
absence of background conditions and/or entities required for that mechanism
to operate:
Under this approach, an operational mechanism provides a
baseline with which to contrast the mechanism’s failure, and
4Numerous experiments with transgenic mice as models of spatial learning have been
brought to the attention of philosophers of science in debates about reduction and reduc-
tive explanation. The methodology inherent in this research turns on creating genetically
engineered mutant mice lacking the expression of certain genes and then tracing the effects
of the absence on cognition, see, e.g., John Bickle 2006.
5The NMDA receptors are ligand-gated ion channels acting as mechanisms for the mod-
ulation of synaptic plasticity and memory.
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the absence provides the causal explanation for differing out-
comes. Mechanism failure may be caused by the absence of a
background condition required for the mechanism’s operation,
or it may be caused by the absence of a part or entity from
the mechanism. (Barros 2013, p. 466)
In line with this, Barros offers two ways of describing absences as causes of
mechanism failure.6 The first is by citing one or several missing background
conditions as explanans. Barros illustrates this idea with an example case
involving a match-striking mechanism designed to operate in normal earth
atmosphere. It follows that as long as the device operates in normal earth
atmosphere it will, ceteris paribus, maintain its operational ability: that of
igniting a match. However, if the match-striking device is instead placed in a
box containing nothing but pure nitrogen, the device would fail to operate (i.e.
the match would not ignite). The reason why the match-striking device fails
to ignite the match in the latter case is due to the absence of oxygen. This
information is retrieved by comparing the first instance, where the match-
striking device operates normally, with the latter instance, where the match-
striking device fails to operate. Hence, the operational failure indicates that
oxygen is a background condition required for the match to ignite. The absence
of oxygen can therefore be cited as explaining the match-striking device’s
failure to operate.
The second way of explaining a mechanism’s failure to operate is by citing a
part or entity that is missing from that mechanism. Barros uses Schaffer’s well-
known gun-firing example to illustrate his point (see Schaffer 2005). In short, if
a certain part is missing from the gun firing mechanism, the mechanism might
fail to operate by reference to the absence of that part, e.g. a spring, a level,
and so forth. The state of mechanism failure is explained in comparison to the
state of a functional mechanism, that is, by contrasting the non-operational
structure with the operational structure.
It does not seem unreasonable to assert, as Barros does, that the difference
in outcome can at times be explained by the absence of necessary conditions
as required for the mechanism to operate. However, it might be a bit too
presumptuous to conclude that “Absences [...] can be best understood as a
part of a causal explanation of mechanism failure” (Barros 2013, p. 468). Let
me explain why.
The notion of “mechanism failure” implies a complete loss of a mechanism’s
operational capacity (i.e. its ability to function). However, the loss of func-
tion in mechanisms is essentially gradual. Consider, for example, instances of
functional decay such as Parkinson’s disease where the absence (deficiency) of
dopamine-generating cells in the substantia nigra leads to a gradual loss (at-
rophy) of memory and other cognitive abilities. The process of memory decay
is described as “gradual” because the production of dopamine is severed and
diminishing, but it is not entirely disrupted.
Although an absence is responsible for the decaying effect on memory, the
effect in question does not satisfy Barros’ criteria for failure since there is no
disruption in operation. I will proceed by showing that the phenomena under
study, which could be called “the effects on mechanism dynamics caused by
absences”, is transitory and varigated. As such, the absence of an entity or
activity can both strengthen and weaken a mechanism. In addition, we saw
6Ned Hall makes a similar point regarding the notion of failure by suggesting that an
absence can be understood as describing “the failure of c to occur” (Hall 2004, p. 248).
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that the failure of dopamine generating cells to produce dopamine leads to
the absence of dopamine, which, in turn, affects cognition.
Under Barros’ conditions, absences are useful for distinguishing between
operational and non-operational mechanisms. In more indefinite situations,
however, the gain in conceptualizing absences as leading to mechanism failure
is not as clear-cut. As I see it, the notion of causation by absence has the ad-
vantage of going beyond merely characterizing and explaining all-or-nothing
phenomena. If we were interested, for example, in whether absences add to or
diminish certain operational features of any given mechanism, we would have
to identify additional causal arrangements that are caused by absences. In
doing so, we need to expand on the idea that absences are the causal explain-
ers of mechanism failure by recognizing additional modes of effect caused by
absences.
In neurobiology, as in the biological and biomedical sciences in general,
absences can lead to attenuation, a phenomenon that is very different from
failure or malfunction. As mentioned previously, mechanisms negatively af-
fected by an absence usually entail the debilitation of a mechanism, that is,
the depletion of strength or exhaustion of a mechanism, but rarely a complete
operational failure. Such degenerating effects are evident in cases of clinical
depression where the normal function of synaptic transmission is affected by
the absence of dopamine, and hence the mechanism’s operation is weakened,
but nonetheless operational. Standardly, research reports in bioscience and
bioengineering journals provides many cases of attenuation attested by arti-
cle titles like “Acetaminophen attenuates dopamine neuron degeneration in
animal models of Parkinson’s disease” (Locke et al. 2008) or “Sensorimotor
attenuation by central motor command signals in the absence of movement”
(Voss et al. 2006). I would even go so far as to suggest that instances of mech-
anism attenuation are more common than instances of mechanism failure, at
least in the biological sciences.
To explain the idea of attenuation, consider what electrical engineers call
an attenuator device. This electronic device reduces the power of a signal
without distorting its (fundamental) waveform. Similarly, an amplifier is a
device that works in the opposite manner, increasing the power of a signal.
These two devices provide either loss or gain in signal amplitude. Similar to
the range of possible variations in signal amplitude, possible effects of absences
come in a continuous scale as a difference in degrees of effects, ranging from a
small lack of, to a complete (total) absence of, entities or activities underlying
mechanistic phenomena. Moreover, in contrast to malfunction, examples of
attenuation dissipate power, without distorting the (fundamental) signal.
Recall that, in regard to the gun-firing example from above, Barros sug-
gests that the absence of a part or entity from the operational baseline of
the mechanism leads to mechanism failure. The following example aims to
show that even the absence of a baseline component of a mechanism does not
necessarily entail failure, or even attenuation. Neuropharmacological agents
known as serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) decrease the breakdown of the
neurotransmitter serotonin, thereby making more serotonin available. SSRIs
have an inhibitory effect on the “molecular transport system” that removes
serotonin from the synaptic cleft. This causes the absence of serotonin re-
moval agents, which in turn leads to increased concentrations of serotonin in
the brain. In contrast to the characterization of absences as responsible for
mechanism failure, the absence of serotonin removal agents provide an exam-
ple where the absence of an entity is causally responsible for enhancing the
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operation of a mechanism by making more serotonin available for postsynap-
tic binding. In line with the attenuator device analogy above, the absence in
question increases the efficacy of transmission.
In summary, the present point is that there are many ways in which an
absence can have an effect on a mechanism, and by appreciating this variety;
we have a larger array of conceptual tools and a better understanding of causal
efficacy to work with. The slogan representing this section goes as follows “a
weakened microbe is still a microbe” or reversely “a strengthened microbe
is still a microbe”. So in order to accord with the empirical descriptions of
mechanisms similar to those described above, we need a characterization of
absence effects that is more nuanced than the one Barros provides. However,
this does not imply that we should throw his insights overboard, especially
the idea of mechanism failure and the use of baseline operation for comparing
facts. Instead we need to expand on these ideas by including the fact that
the absence of an entity can both strengthen and weaken a mechanism. Of
course this also means that the task of incorporating absences as explainers
of mechanisms still remains unsolved.
5. How to map an absence
Contemporary mechanists commonly make a distinction between representa-
tional models of mechanisms and the mechanisms the models describe (Craver
2006). As most recently noted by Holly Andersen, “it is useful to distinguish
between mechanisms, which are actual chains of appropriately causally con-
nected entities in the world, and mechanism models, which are descriptions
or schemas of such mechanisms used to explain the phenomena for which the
mechanism are responsible” (Andersen 2012, p. 416).
However, I am not sure whether Barros has this demarcation in mind. At
times it seems that he is equating mechanistic properties with the represen-
tation thereof, as in the following passage when discussing Shaffer’s example:
The operation of this mechanism explains why the gun fires,
and provides our baseline. Now remove the spring from the
gun. If the trigger is pulled after the spring was removed,
the gun would not fire. Without the spring, the gun firing
mechanism fails. This failure as compared to the baseline is
explained by the absence of the spring. (Barros 2013, p. 467)
Needless to say, it seems to me that a clear distinction between a mechanism
and a representation of a mechanism is essential in order for the notion of
baseline to work. In other words, saying that a mechanism has failed to operate
requires some antecedent notion of what it means to say that a mechanism is
operational. This calls for an understanding of the notion of baseline operation
as reflecting a certain mode of describing a mechanism, instead of something
inherent in the mechanism per se.7
7In the previous section we saw that many examples of mechanism failure seemingly
evinced from human-made artifacts (e.g., the gun-firing mechanism, the match-striking
device etc.). At first glance these examples might be seen as providing grounds for objection
in that they indicate that there is no need for a description when artifacts themselves embody
the baseline operation. In other words, a gun-firing mechanism’s ability to fire bullets is
not subject to our representations; the mechanism either works or it does not. But this
way of reasoning overlooks the historical fact that someone at some place in time was first
to say that the gun-firing mechanism was operational and described it as such, a feat that
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So, in order for a comparison between operational and non-operational
mechanisms to be possible, the first thing that needs to be done is to establish
how to characterize an operational mechanism. Barros himself recognizes that
“mechanistic approaches to explanation seek to explain a phenomenon by
describing the mechanism that produces or causes the phenomenon” (Barros
2013, p. 456, my emphasis). This allows for the description of a mechanism
to be contrasted with another description of the same mechanism when the
two deviates in some aspect from each other. The deviation or failure of a
mechanism caused by an absence can then be understood as a digression or
irregularity in reference to the previously established description as a point
of reference on how the mechanism is normally expected to function. Hence,
only in relation to a description does it become possible to judge whether that
mechanism is operational.8
Arguably, it is a pragmatic choice to treat a particular structure as a base-
line; it depends on the phenomenon we are interested in investigating.9 Stan-
dardly, descriptions of mechanisms begin and finish at some point whereas
the mechanisms themselves rarely have such boundaries. Examples of cyclic
mechanisms such as the cyclic conversion of nitrogen through various biolog-
ical and physical processes (i.e. fixation, ammonification, nitrification and
denitrification), circadian rhythms, Krebs cycles etc., clearly illustrate this
point. We must then conclude that where to begin and end the description
of a mechanism is often pragmatic. A similar thing can be said about the
features we ascribe to operational mechanisms; such as deciding what heart
rate to consider “normal” for a functioning heart. For this reason, and as
commonly defined (see, e.g. Hornsby 2010), it is the measurement or the
thing measured that makes up the baseline. The thing measured can vary
considerably, and in the case of choosing between (normal) heart rates, this
means choosing from 60 up to 100 beats per minute as the baseline. Most
importantly, it is not the descriptions of the features that is the baseline but
the features themselves. The description only picks outs certain features as
the baseline by zoning in on specific properties or targets that are out there
in the world, such as the physical condition of the heart and its capacity to
circulate blood, while ignoring other properties, perhaps the hearts color, or
the herts ability to resist bullets and so on. Only in this (ontic) sense can
the baseline, whatever it represents as long the thing represented is tangible,
serve as a basis for comparing deviations. This opens up the possibility for a
contrastive explanation of how absences effectuate mechanistic productivity.
To consolidate the insights made so far: claiming that the mechanism has
failed to operate or has deviated from baseline operation amounts to (i) having
already established what the representation of a baseline of that mechanism
consists of and (ii) found a deviation from that representation by reference
required a representation, either mental or physical, of a functioning gun-firing mechanism
to be in place. Indeed, a mental construction can serve as an instruction for an existing
or not yet existing object. In this respect, arguing from the mechanism failure of artifacts
clearly understates the case for causation by absence in scientific practice.
8Interestingly, Barros argues that to contrastively understand why one person has scurvy
and another does not “there is no need to establish one alternative as normal to explain
the difference” (Barros 2013, p. 464) even after noting previously on the same page that
“in medicine, departure from normal function is a common way of defining disease”. This
is very peculiar from a descriptive point of view since medicine belongs to the domain of
sciences falling under the purview of mechanistic explanation, as evinced by his own example
involving scurvy (ibid., p. 464).
9It is important, I think, to emphasize that this does not rely on the act of representing
but rather on what the representations represent, i.e real productive processes in the world.
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to another description representing the deviation. In this sense, describing a
failure or a deviation by comparison with the baseline supposition essentially
means establishing a mismatch between representations of a target (mech-
anism). The types of mismatches examined in this paper (i.e. failure, at-
tenuation, enhancement) suggest that these mismatches come in degrees pro-
portional to the discrepancy found between baseline operation and deviations
from baseline operation. As indicated, the stretch from baseline to mecha-
nism failure can be considerable and cover a substantial range of mechanistic
phenomena.
For the remainder of this section, we turn to the yet remaining obstacle for
incorporating absences into the mechanistic framework of explanation. As we
saw, production requires the existence of a link (“oomph”) between cause and
effect, meaning that causal relationships without such links, as in causation by
absence, appear to provide serious problems for incorporation. The problem
results from the adaptation of the ontic form of explanation according to which
“real worldly mechanisms explain their phenomena by producing them” (Illari
and Williamson 2010, p. 280).
As I hope to have shown in previous sections, absences cannot be explained
by merely appealing to the information found in the physical mechanism, be-
cause it exhibits no entities or activities one can interpret as causally affecting
the mechanism by not being a part of it. This has lead some philosophers
to conclude that, in order to count absences as causes, the ontic view needs
to be augmented or modified (see, e.g., Tabery 2004; Torres 2009, but see
also; Wright 2012). I will argue that this might not have to be the case and
that there are other means of showing how absences are situated in the causal
structure of mechanisms that are compatible with the ontic view of expla-
nation. An important starting assumption for what follows is that absences
are difference-makers. If my plant lacks water, it will die. If Mg2+ is not
present, there will be an influx of Ca2+ to the neuronal membrane, and so
forth. Since the latter example is paradigmatic of mechanistic explanation
and well rehearsed in the literature, we will use it to illustrate how absences
can be incorporated within the ontic view of causal production.
So in order to explain how the absence of magnesium (Mg2+) ions causes
the influx of calcium (Ca2+) ions into the neural membrane, we enlist the
following conception.
A baseline, conceived of as representing the mechanism’s structure (i.e. en-
tities and activities out in the world) including Mg2+, is contrasted with a
deviation, conceived of as representing a corresponding structure but without
Mg2+. Both representations are ontic in the sense that they only represent
the presence of entities and activities as causes of production. We now have
an ontic explanation of a mechanism (M) to be contrasted with an ontic ex-
planation of M where Mg2+ is absent (M*). As suggested earlier, the choice of
baseline is pragmatic and the mechanism where Mg2+ is absent might equally
be represented as the baseline.
The next step is to compare the baseline M with the deviation M*. This
comparison, between two ontic explanations of production, allows for the map-
ping of the mismatch in operation as caused by an absence. In this sense, we
have a contrastive relation between M and M*, representing two classes of
contrasting events, which delimit, and hence explain any possible difference
making effect on production that might be the result of an absence. For ex-
ample, when Mg2+ is present there is no influx of Ca2+ (according to M),
and when Mg2+ is not present, there is an influx of Ca2+ (according to M*).
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The outcome in M*, then, is causally attributed to an absence. Since these
two explanations of production are both ontic, the explanation gained by con-
trasting them should be ontic as well. In this sense, saying that the absence
of Mg2+ causes the influx of Ca2+ means that the operation of M* deviates
from its operational baseline M.
By the same token, we can explain results following from more nuanced
effects of an absence previously characterized as a lack of something. These
types of absences are also explained by contrasting the description of a target
(mechanism) with a baseline value outcome with a description of the same
target representing a deviating value outcome.10 The more specific idea here
takes the outcome as relative to a set of values gradually representing differ-
ences between contrasts by comparison to a fixed value serving as the baseline.
As such, the baseline (base) is then contrasted with the target (to be explained)
phenomena. This means that the base serves as a point of departure for any
(potential) inferences that are drawn about the target. For instance, imagine
different concentrations of a certain substance S in two Petri dishes, each con-
taining a squid giant axon. The base specifies the optimal concentration of S
in mechanism M for a specific explanatory purpose, such as explaining some
property of an action potential. We then use this specification as a baseline
(base) for guiding the interpretation of deviations.
Now think of an alternate concentration of S in M, representing a deficiency,
as the target. In this case, the deficiency might have been indicated by, e.g.
the response rate to electric stimuli being slower in target compared to base.
This allows for an interpretation of target as resulting from an insufficient
concentration level of the substance S. Comparably, we might contrast an
abnormally high concentration of S in M with base. The abnormally high
concentration of S in the target might then result in higher response rate to
stimuli and therefore be described as enhancing or outperforming the base.
Notice that while contrasting the base and the target we have only relied on
the presence of entities for construing our explanations. “Presences” have been
compared as a way of establishing possible differences in productive outcome
resulting from an absence. From this, the effects of an absence can be asserted
as causally affecting casual productivity.11 My approach to incorporating ab-
sences into mechanistic explanation is inherently model-based, which actually
reflects the fact that scientists put forward representations of a mechanism;
they do not put forward the mechanism itself. The inclusion of absences in
the sense presented above allows for a greater diversity of causal connections
to feature in mechanistic accounts of production without compromising the
ontic sense of explanation.
10To reiterate once more, this amounts to comparing descriptions of two actually occur-
ring scenarios (and not of an actual scenario and an imaginary one as in, e.g., counterfactual
accounts of causation). Comparing actual events or sets thereof is motivated by scientific
practice. This is what scientists themselves do; they compare the actual state in a Petri dish
(cell culture dish) with a state in some other Petri dish. Molecular biologists do not, as far
as I know, normally compare the state in one Petri dish with a counterfactual alternative
state in a hypothetical Petri dish. Similarly, what goes on in the Petri dish is supposed to
mirror what goes on in the brain.
11Notice also that it is not argued that a “nothing” causes a “something” in some
deep metaphysical sense but that the difference in comparison between two descriptions
can explain how an absence might effectuate the causal productivity of a mechanism. The
advantage of this idea is that it coincides with ontic descriptions of causal mechanisms.
This allows for maintaining the condition of ontic adequacy while being able to explain the
difference (i.e. the cause/effect) when an absence (total absence of something or a lack of
something) is introduced.
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It should be added that this way of resolving the incorporation problem
presupposes a distinction between causation and causal explanation, whereby
I am not suggesting that absences are causes per se, but rather that they can
be considered as explainers of causal productivity of mechanisms. Although
the investigation of the so-called “many absence problem” (as phrased by
Lavelle et al. forthcoming), which proliferates the number of absences causally
responsible for an event, has not been touched upon, the solution presented
in this paper might be seen as a promising point of departure for tackling this
problem in the mechanistic domain. The choice of baseline and deviation takes
place in a context where deviations are constrained by the baseline operation
of mechanisms.
In this respect, the suggestion is that only entities that are part of the
mechanism operation can be held responsible for affecting that operation by
being absent. For instance, in the case of vitamin C curing a cold, the absence
of vitamin C should not be viewed as the causal basis for the development of
the cold (the organism affected by the cold does not normally produce vitamin
C). Vitamin C can be efficacious for treating the cold, a fact that should be
separated from the colds epidemiology. The reason perhaps being that only
entities featuring in the baseline specification of a mechanism, can be treated
as affecting that mechanism by their absence. However, this way of defining
“genuine” absences turn out to be problematic in some cases. If we, for ex-
ample, consider the absence of food as causing starvation it is obvious that
food is not originally part of the digestive system but introduced from external
sources. But of course these cases can, and should, be treated (pragmatically)
as depending on the phenomena to be explained.
In conclusion, I believe that my account does capture a significant aspect
of scientific practice better than Barros’ does. And most of the conceptions
scientists invoke to explain the effects of absences can be accommodated within
my extended framework.
6. Conclusion
The metaphysics entailed by absences is a thorny issue. However, in this paper
I have argued that the effects of absences on mechanisms can be accounted for
by contrasting actual instances of production. As suggested above, absences
are mapped by comparing interpretative descriptions, and hence, ontic expla-
nations of mechanisms. I hope to have made clear that Benjamin Barros’ idea
of mechanism failure is not sufficient for a descriptively adequate account of
causation by absence in the biological sciences.
A descriptively accurate account of scientific practice needs to acknowledge
talk about effects leading to vacillating forms of operational functionality. I
have showed that, by generalizing from the examples provided in this paper,
absences are causally responsible for a wide spectrum of effects on mechanism
operation, including attenuation, enhancement and failure to operate. More
generally, these examples illustrate an important lesson from biological prac-
tice for accounts of causal explanation. We have seen that, at least when it
comes to the biological sciences, one can speak of types of functionality, and
degrees thereof, pertaining to the same biological mechanism affected by an
absence.
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